@Amiral74
Si la clé DES était dans le dump, il n'y aurait aucun problème.
Il est crypté, ce qui signifie que les données doivent être calculées par le processeur du récepteur.
@Marcassin
Rien n'est connu pour le V7.
You're absolutely right. On Canal Ready decoders (such as those based on the STIH237 chipset), operation is based on a chain of keys and secure processes:
Typical operation:
BoxKey (unique): serves as a hardware identifier and a basis for deriving other keys.
Stored encrypted key (e.g., EncryptedKey.bin): located in a partition or secure area.
Integrated cryptographic engine (CPU): decrypts this key using the BoxKey and sometimes a bootloader key or a Secure Boot Key (SBK).
Dynamically calculated DESKey / AESKey: used to decrypt ECMs via the card.
What I am considering is:
Yes, I can reverse or simulate this decryption step if:
I extract the encrypted key from the strong partition.
I replicate the derivation method (by firmware reverse engineering or simulation).
I have the correct BoxKey.
What we can do:
Identify and extract this encrypted key from the SPI dump.
Compare with the derivations observed in emulated firmware (e.g., main_task, parse_ecm, aes_decrypt_block).
Create a simulator that reproduces this derivation (possibly in C/Python or QEMU/unicorn).
I don't know if I'll succeed.